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ABSTRACT 
We build a theoretical model to examine how supervision (auditing) can be utilized to enhance the 
efficiency of corporate governance and how collusive supervision (auditing) can be deterred. We 
introduce the outcomes of “Monotone Comparative Statics” ala Topkis (1978) and Edlin and 
Shannon (1998), and Milgrom and Segal (2002)’s generalized envelope theorem, and construct a 
three-tier agency model with a mathematically tractable structure. This should be an advantage in 
modeling in comparison with the collusion literature e.g., Kofman and Lawarree (1993)’s auditing 
application of the three-tier agency model ala Tirole (1986, 1992). The basic trade-off involved in 
adding the auditor (supervisor) into the hierarchy is the benefit from the discrete reduction in 
information rent and the improvement of marginal incentives (outputs) versus the resource cost of 
the auditor (supervisor), and this bottom line is consistently preserved through the extension and 
generalization of the model. In addition to the theoretical (mainly technical) investigation, the paper 
also derives some clear and robust implication applicable to corporate governance reform.  
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1. Introduction   
 
Recently, auditing has rapidly been increasing in importance in Japan, as well as in the U.S. and 
Western countries, to meet the needs of corporate governance. Corporate scandals such as those that 
rocked Yamaichi Securities, Daiwa Bank, Snow Brand Milk Products, and Kanebo in Japan and 
Enron and WorldCom in the U.S. are examples of firms that failed to build up the effective corporate 
governance, and collusive supervision (auditing) and revelation of false information was a common 
occurrence. Auditors (supervisors) usually have greater access to accurate information on the agents, 
but are subject to collusive pressure (the collusive offer) from the auditees (agents). The means by 
which adequate supervision (auditing) is used to enhance the efficiency of corporate governance and 
by which collusive supervision (auditing) can be deterred are important parts of corporate 
governance reform. 
In a typical framework of top management organization of Japanese firms, a shareholders’ 
meeting elects a director (or the Board of Directors) and an auditor who audits the execution of the 
management work and makes a report at the shareholders’ meeting. With this auditing system, which 
has been legally amended several times, it is often said that the auditor has access to a great deal of 
information inside the firm, including the ability of top managers to perform their jobs, while on the 
other hand it is doubtful that the auditor can objectively supervise the management while 
maintaining his independence. Indeed, there is a notion that collusive auditing often exists where an 
auditor and a manager collude to manipulate information. Thus, corporations should optimally 
utilize the auditing information in order to increase the shareholders’ interests, with the arrangement 
that auditor and manager do not collude. Many Japanese firms, such as Toyota and Cannon, do 
preserve and try to improve this traditional Japanese auditing system. Our paper can be viewed as an 
analysis of this top management organization in a hidden information setting. 
Literature exists that deals with the issues associated with corporate governance and auditing in a 
three-tier agency model with collusion, developed by Tirole (1986, 1992) and Laffont and Tirole 
(1991), Laffont and Martimort (1997) etc. In particular, Kofman and Lawarree (1993) applied a 
three-tier agency model---consisting of the two-type (productivity) agent, the internal and external 
auditors (supervisors), and the principal---to the issue of auditing and collusion. 1 However, this is a 
rather complicated model whose structure involves a Kuhn-Tucker problem with many IC (Incentive 
Compatibility) and IR (Individual Rationality) constraints, and is not a simple mathematical model. 
This mathematical complexity of this model is a disadvantage. 
So, we start with an extremely simple three-tier collusion model, which is a natural extension of 
the familiar screening (self selection) models, and then generalize its investigation to a continuum of 
                                                  
1 Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)’s recent textbook presents a simple version of the collusion models 
(Tirole (1986), Kofman and Lawarree (1993)). 
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types version. Then we introduce here the outcomes of “Monotone Comparative Statics” à la Topkis 
(1978), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Edlin and Shannon (1998), and Milgrom and Segal (2002) into 
the analysis of corporate governance in a three-tier agency model. Our paper provides a framework 
that can address the issues treated in the existing literature in a much simpler fashion, and is indeed 
beneficial in that we can obtain clearer and more robust implications for corporate governance 
reform of top management organization. 
The basic tradeoff in our model is the benefit from the reduction in information rent by adding the 
auditor (supervisor) versus the resource cost of adding him into the hierarchy, and this bottom line is 
preserved through the extension and generalization of the model. The optimal collusion-proof 
contract in the Principal-Supervisor-Agent three-tier regime has the property whereby (1) Efficiency 
at the top (the highest type) and (2) Downward distortion for all other types, and the downward 
distortion is mitigated at the optimum, in comparison with the Principal-Agent two-tier regime. 
Whether the principal indeed has an incentive to introduce a supervisor---that is, selects a three-tier 
hierarchy---depends on the balance between the net benefits from both the improvement of marginal 
incentives (outputs) and the reduction in information rent and the resource cost of the auditor 
(supervisor). We obtained this result by constructing a three-tier model with a mathematically more 
tractable structure, which exploited the outcome of “Monotone Comparative Statics” à la Topkis 
(1978) and Edlin and Shannon (1998), and Milgrom and Segal (2002)’s generalized envelope 
theorem. 
 
2. Motivational Example: Solution with Two Types: 
 
2.1 Principal-Agent Hidden Information Setting  
 
We consider two players: a principal (P) and an agent (A). The principal owns the firm and hires 
the manager (agent) to run it. Profits are X eθ= + , where θ  is the manager’s ability to run the 
firm and e  is the effort he supplies. θ  a priori belongs to{ },θ θ  and the prior beliefs are 
( )Pr hθ θ= = . Expending effort e  costs the manager ( )C e  in disutility, which satisfies 
( ) ( )0, 0, 0,C e C e C e +′ ′′> > > ∀ ∈\ .W  is the wage payment the agent receives, and then his 
utility is ( )W C e− . We normalize the agent’s reservation utility as 0. The timing of the game is as 
follows. Prior to contracting, θ  is determined randomly by nature and is known only to the 
manager (agent). The principal proposes a take-it-or-leave-it compensation offer to the manager. The 
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form of the contract is{ },X W . X  is the level of profits the manager is required to obtain in the 
first period and the wage he will be paid if he generates the required level. If he produces less 
than
W
X , the agent receives no pay. If he generates more than X , he will still receive onlyW .  If 
the manager rejects the offer, the game ends. If he accepts the offer, a contract is signed and the 
principal is fully committed. This is a standard screening problem. We specify{ } { }, 0= ,1θ θ , 
( ) 2 4C e e=  and ( )Pr 1 1 2hθ θ= = = = .  
Now, we examine the optimal solution. Let ( )1X  and ( )0X be the profits specified for the 
good type ( 1θ = ) and the bad type ( 0θ = ) respectively. We write  and 1X 0X  for ( )1X  
and ( )0X , respectively. Define and ( )1W ( )0W similarly: These are the wages specified by the 
contracts.  
   The benchmark first best solution maximizes the expected profits, subject to the IR (Individual 
Rationality) constraints, which require that the manager be willing to sign a contract whatever her 
type. That is,  
{ } { } [ ] [ ]
( )
( )
1 1 0 0
1 1 0, , ,
1 1
0 0
1 1max  
2 2
      s.t.      1 0
                 0
X W X W 0
X W X W
W C X
W C X
− + −
− − ≥
− ≥
 
Substituting ( ) ( )21 1 11 1W C X X= − = − 4  and ( ) 20 0 0 4W C X X= =  into the objective 
function results in the expected total surplus maximization: 
{ } { } ( )1 1 0 0
2 2
1 1 0 0, , ,
1 1max  1 4 4
2 2X W X W
X X X X⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − + −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  
 The first order conditions for the optimum are: 
( )1 11 1 2 0 FBX X 3− − = ⇔ =  
0 01 2 0
FBX X 2− = ⇔ =  
We easily find that  1 2 1
FB FBW W= =
Next, under the assumption of asymmetric information onθ , we seek the separating contracts, 
which induce the two types to behave differently. For this, the contracts must be incentive 
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compatible. 
IC (Incentive Compatibility) requires: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 1 0 0 1 1 0 01 4 1 4W C X W C X W X W Xθ θ− − ≥ − − ⇔ − − ≥ − − (1a) 
( ) ( ) 20 0 1 1 0 0 1 14W C X W C X W X W Xθ θ− − ≥ − − ⇔ − ≥ − 2 4
)
                     (1b) 
(1a) states that the good type ( prefers to select the contract intended for him rather than select 
the contract intended for the bad type
1θ =
( )0θ = , that is, the good type’s IC constraint. (1b) states that 
the bad type ( prefers to select the contract intended for him rather than select the contract 
intended for the good type , that is, the bad type’s IC. 
)
)
0θ =
( 1θ =
The IR (Individual Rationality) constraints require: 
( ) ( )21 1 1 1 1 4 0W C X W Xθ− − = − − ≥                                      (2a)       
 ( ) 20 0 0 0 4 0W C X W Xθ− − = − ≥                                           (2b)              
The first best solution { } { } { } { }1 2 1 2, 3, 2 , ,FB FB FB FBX X W W= 1,1= is not incentive compatible for 
the good type, since he has an incentive to tell a lie (mimic/pretend type 0θ = ). Indeed, we can 
check the incentive of the good type 1θ = . 
If he tells the truth" 1"θ = : he obtains ( )21 3 1 4 0− − = . 
If he says " 0"θ =  (i.e., lie), he obtains ( )21 2 1 4 3− − = 4  
Hence, he has an incentive to tell a lie (mimic/pretend), i.e., not incentive compatible. 
As is typical in such problems, only the good type’s IC (1a) and the bad type’s IR (2b) bind at the 
optimum. From (2b), 20 0 4W X= . Substituting it into (1a) with equality, we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 221 1 0 0 0 0 01 4 1 4 4 1 4 2 1W X W X X X X− − = − − = − − = − 4           (3) 
This is the information rent for the good type. Hence, the optimization problem can be written as 
follows 
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[ ] [ ]
( ) ( )
1 1 0 0
2
1 1 0
2
1 1max  
2 2
s.t.      1 4 2 1 4
          2
X W X W
W X X
W X
− + −
− − = −
=0 0
 
Substitute 20 0 2W X=  and ( ) ( )21 1 01 4 2 1 4W X X= − + −  into the objective function. 
( ) ( )
1 0
2 02
1 1 0 0,
Expected Total Surplus "Information Rent"
for the good type
2 11 1 1max  1 4 2
2 2 2X X
X
X X X X
4
−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − + − − ⋅⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦	
 	

 
The first order conditions for the optimum are: 
 ( ) *1 11 1 2 0 3 FBX X− − = ⇔ = = 1X  
            N
*
0 0
      MarginalMarginal Surplus
Information Rentfor the bad type
1 2 1 2 0 1 FBX X− − = ⇔ = < =	
 0 2X  
The result is quite a standard one. (1) Efficiency at the top (the good type) *1 1
FBX X=   and                        
(2) Downward distortion at the bottom (the bad type) *0 0
FBX X< . The intuition for the result is that a 
small reduction in 0X  from the first best level 0
FBX results in a second-order (marginal) reduction 
in total surplus for the bad type, but generates a first-order (discrete) reduction in the good type’s 
information rent, through relaxing the IC for the good type and allowing the principal to reduce 
discretely. W
 
2.2 Collusion and Supervision 
 
Now, we introduce a third player, called the “supervisor”, into the model. The principal has access, 
at a cost , to the supervisor who is an internal auditor and can, for each z θ , provide proof of the 
fact (θ ) with probability 1 2p = , and with 1 1p 2− = , is unable to obtain any information. We 
assume that proofs of θ  cannot be falsified, and thus the agent is protected against false claims that 
his type θ  is higher/lower than what it really is. On the other hand, the agent can potentially 
benefit from a failure by the supervisor to truthfully report that his type is 1θ = , when the 
supervisor observes the signal θ . A self-interested supervisor will collude with the agent only if he 
benefits from such behavior. Specifically, let us assume the following collusion technology: if the 
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agent offers the supervisor a transfer (side payment) , he benefits up to , where t kt [ ]0,1k∈ . The 
idea is that transfers of this sort, being prevented by the principal, may be hard to organize and 
subject to resource losses. We follow the literature in assuming that side-contracts of this sort are 
possible (See, e.g., Tirole 1992). 
To avoid collusion, the principal will have to offer the supervisor a reward sW for providing 1θ = , 
such that the following coalition incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied.   
            ( ) ( ) ( )1 0 0 01 24s
kW kU k C X C X X≥ = − − = −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ 1  
Indeed, once the information 1θ =  is obtained, the principal will drop the Agent 1θ = ’s 
payment to , and not pay the information rent to the agent 1W ( 1 1C X − ) 1θ = . The agent is thus 
ready to pay the supervisor an amount of ( )1 02 1U X= − 4 , and the value of this side payment to 
the supervisor is [ ]1, where 0,1kU k∈ . Therefore, hiring a supervisor and eliciting his information 
requires the principal to pay to the supervisor if the (hard) information of1kU 1θ =  is provided. 
The virtual surplus for the good type 1θ =  in the Principal-Supervisor-Agent regime is,  
( ) ( ) ( )2 0 01 1
Expected Total Surplus Information Rent Information Rent
    for the good type for the good type for the supervisor
2 1 2 11 1 1 1 4
2 2 2 4 2
X XkX X
4
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤− − − ⋅ +⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
	
 	
 	

 
Hence, the expected total virtual surplus is: 
( )
N
( ) ( )2 0 02
1 1 0 0
1 2Expected Total Surplus Information Rent Information Rent
for the good type for the supervisor
2 1 2 11 1 1 1 1 4 4
2 2 2 2 4 2
h
X XkX X X X
=
4
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − + − − ⋅ +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
	
 	
 	

 
The first order conditions for the optimum are: 
( )1 11 1 2 0 3SX X− − = ⇔ = = 1FBX              
 7
N N
0
Marginal increase in Marginal increase inMarginal Surplus
Information Rent Information Rentfor the bad type
for the good type for the supervisor
      Total Marginal
    I
1 2 21
2 2 4 2 4
X k
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− − ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
	
 0 0
nformation Rent
10 2
2
S FkX X+ 2B= ⇔ = − < =
	

 
 
Proposition 1: 
In the Principal-Supervisor-Agent regime, the optimal collusion-proof contract has the following 
properties that   
(1) Efficiency at the top (the good type) 1 1 3
S FBX X= =                            
(2) Downward distortion at the bottom (the bad type) is mitigated, that is,  
N*0 0 0
   Equality
holds at 1
11 2
2
S F
k
kX X X
=
2B+= ≤ = − < = .  
 
The result (2) comes from the reduction in total and marginal information rents by the introduction 
of a supervisor with . This is at least efficiency improving.  1k ≤
Last, we will check the condition under which the principal has an incentive to introduce a 
supervisor into the organization.  
The principal’s payoff with no supervisor is, by substituting * *1 03, 1X X= = , 
( ) [ ] ( )2
Expected Total Surplus "Information Rent" 
 for the good type
2 11 1 1 33  3 1 4 1 1 4 1 1
2 2 2 4 8
NS
P
−⎡ ⎤∏ = − − + − − ⋅ = + − = +⎣ ⎦	
 	

1 1
8 4
 
The principal’s payoff with supervisor is, by substituting 1 0
13, 2
2
S S kX X += = − , 
( )
N
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
2
2
Expected Total Surplus
1 2 Information Rent Information Rent
for the good type for the superv
1 1 3 1 33  3 1 4
2 2 2 4 2
2 3 2 1 2 3 2 11 1     
2 2 4 2 4
S
P
h
k k
k kk
=
⎡ ⎤− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤∏ = − − + −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
− − − −− ⋅ +
	

	
 N    Set up cost
for the supervisor
isor
z
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
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( )( ) ( )( )2
     Set u
Information Rent Information Rent
Expected Total Surplus for the good type for the supervisor
3 1 3 11 3 1 3 1 11
2 2 4 2 2 2 4 2 4
k kk k k z
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ − − − −− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎢ ⎥= + − − ⋅ + −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
	
 	
	

N
p cost
for the supervisor
          
( )2 21 3 1 3 1 11
2 2 4 2 2 2 4
kk k k z
⎡ ⎤ −⎡ ⎤− − +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + − − ⋅ −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
 
Comparing NSP∏ and SP∏ , we have the condition under which the principal has an incentive to 
introduce a supervisor, that is, a three-tier hierarchy: 
( )
( )( ) ( )
2 21 1 3 1 3 1 1
4 2 2 4 2 2 2 4
1 1 3       -----
32
kk k k z
z k k
⎡ ⎤ −⎡ ⎤− − +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞≤ − − ⋅⎢ ⎥ −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
⇔ ≤ − − ∗
 
We present a figure, which represents the region ( ),k z  satisfying this condition. 
( )∗ and 0 correspond to the cross-hatched area in the figure below. 1k≤ ≤
[ ]( )0,1k ∈
z  
 
 
3 3 2  
10  3
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We can read this figure as follows. As , the benefit due to the reduction in the information 
rent by the introduction of a supervisor is greater. So, even if (set up cost) is greater (
0k →
z 3 32z → ), 
the principal has an incentive to hire a supervisor. On the other hand, as , since the benefit 
due to the reduction in the information rent by the introduction of the supervisor is smaller, only 
when  is small enough, hiring supervisor is better than not hiring him. However, collusion indeed 
reduces the benefit from supervision, which is reflected by the greater downward distortions. 
1k →
z
 
3.3 Another specification 
 
We present another specification of the setting and its result. Profits are multiplicative X eθ= , 
whereθ  is the manager’s ability with { } { }, 1,θ θ = 2 and  is the effort he supplies. Cost 
function is
e
( ) 2C e e= .  is the wage payment, and the manager’s utility is . 
The timing of the game is the same as before. The form of the contract is
W ( ) 2W C e W e− = −
{ },X W . X  is the level 
of profits the manager is required to obtain and the wage he will be paid if he generates the 
required level.  
W
Let  and be the profits specified for the good type (2X 1X 2θ = ) and the bad type ( 1θ = ), 
respectively. Define and similarly. The point is that in order for type 2W 1W θ  to attain X , he 
must supply the amount of effort e X θ= . 
IC (Incentive Compatibility) requires: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 22 2 1 1 2 2 1 12 2 2 2W C X W C X W X W X− ≥ − ⇔ − ≥ −
2
        
  ( ) ( ) 2 21 1 2 2 1 1 2W C X W C X W X W X− ≥ − ⇔ − ≥ −
The IR (Individual Rationality) constraints require: 
( ) ( )22 2 2 22 2 0W C X W X− = − ≥
≥
1
                                                
                           ( ) 21 1 1 1 0W C X W X− = −
As is typical in such problems, only the good type’s IC and the bad type’s IR bind at the optimum. 
Substituting into 21W X= ( ) (22 2 1 12W X W X− = − )22  with equality, we have 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 222 2 1 1 1 1 12 2 2 3W X W X X X X− = − = − = 2 4 . This is the information rent for the 
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good type. Eventually, we solve the following problem: 
( )
2 1
2 2 2
2 2 1 1 1,
Expected Total Surplus "Information Rent"
for the good type
1 1max  2
2 2X X
X X X X X⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + − − ⋅⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
1 3
2 4	
 	

 
The first order conditions for the optimum are: 
 *2 21 2 0 2
FB
1X X X− = ⇔ = =  
                    *1 1 1 1
Marginal Surplus       Marginal
for the bad type Information Rent
1 2 3 2 0 2 7 1 2FBX X X X− − = ⇔ = < =	
 	
  
The results show (1) Efficiency at the top (the good type) *2 2
FBX X=  and (2) Downward distortion 
at the bottom (the bad type) *1 1
FBX X< . 
 Now, we introduce a supervisor into the model. In order to induce the information truthfully from 
the supervisor, the following coalition incentive compatibility constraint should be satisfied.   
                            N
2
1
Wage Payment Information Rent
for the supervisor for the good type
3 4sW k X≥ ⋅ 	
  
At the optimum, 213sW k X= ⋅ 4  holds. Substituting it into the Principal’s objective function, her 
program to design the optimal collusion-proof contract will result in: 
( )
N1 2
2 2 2
2 2 1 1 1 1,
1 2Expected Total Surplus Information Rent Information Rent
for the good type for the supervisor
1 1 1 1 3 3max   2
2 2 2 2 4 2 4X X
h
k 2X X X X X X
=
z
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + − − ⋅ +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
	
 	
 	

 
The first order conditions for the optimum are: 
 
2 11 2 0 2
S
1
FBX X X− = ⇔ = =              
N N1 1 1Marginal Surplus
Marginal increase in Marginal increase infor the bad type
Information Rent Information Rent
for the good type for the supervisor
      Total Marginal
    In
3 31 2
4 4
kX X X
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
	

S
1 1
formation Rent
4 10
11 3 2
FBX X
k
= ⇔ = < =+
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Proposition 2: 
In the Principal-Supervisor-Agent regime, the optimal collusion-proof contract has the property that   
(1) Efficiency at the top (the good type) 2 2 2
S FBX X= =                            
(2) Downward distortion at the bottom (the bad type) is mitigated, that is,  
N*1 1 1
   Equality
holds at 1
2 4
7 11 3
S F
k
X X X
k
=
= ≤ = < =+
1
2
B .  
 
Last, we check the condition under which the principal has an incentive to bring a supervisor into 
the organization.  
The principal’s payoff with no supervisor is: 
( ) ( ) 22 2
Expected Total Surplus "Information Rent" 
for the good type
1 1 1 32  2 2 2 7 2 7
2 2 2 4
NS
P
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∏ = − + − − ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠	

2
7	

 
The principal’s payoff with a supervisor is: 
( )
N
2 2
2
1 2 Information Rent Information RentExpected Total Surplus for the good type for the sup
1 1 4 4 1 1 3 4 3 42  2 2
2 2 11 3 11 3 2 2 4 11 3 2 4 11 3
S
P
h
k
k k k k
=
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤∏ = − + − − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ + + + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ 	
	

ervisor
z
2
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
	

 
The condition for NS SP P∏ ≤∏  is obtained from the simple calculation:  
( )1 1   -----
14 11 3
z
k
≤ − ∗∗+ . 
If we draw a figure, which represents the region of ( ),k z  satisfying this condition, its shape 
resembles the former one. 
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3. Generalization: Principal-Agent Hidden Information Model with a Continuum of Types 
 
3.1. Setting 
 
We consider two players: a principal (P) and an agent (A). The principal owns the firm and hires the 
manager (agent) to run it. θ  is the manager’s ability to run the firm and ( ,C X )θ  is the effort 
cost for the manager of type θ  to attain the output X . For each θ , ( ,C X )θ satisfies 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2, 0, , 0, , 0,C X C X X C X X Xθ θ θ +> ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ > ∀ ∈\ . W  is the wage payment 
the agent receives, and so his utility is ( ),W C X θ− . We normalize the agent’s reservation utility 
as 0. The timing of the game is as follows. Prior to contracting, θ  is determined randomly by 
nature and is known only to the manager (agent). The principal proposes a take-it-or-leave-it contract 
offer to the manager. The contract is written as ( )W X , where X  is the output level by the 
manager and W is the wage he receives if he generates X . If the manager accepts the offer, a 
contract is signed and the principal is fully committed. If he rejects the offer, the game ends. 
 
3.2 Preliminary: Single Crossing Property (SCP) and Monotonicity of Agent’s Choice 
 
Faced with a wage scheme , the agent of type ( )W X θ  will choose  
 ( ) ( )arg max ,
X
X W X C X θ
∈Χ
∈ −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
Analysis is dramatically simplified when the Agent’s types can be ordered so that higher types 
choose a higher output when faced with any wage. We identify when solutions to the parameterized 
maximization program ( ) ( ) ( )max , : ,
X
U X W X C Xθ θ
∈Χ
= −  are strictly increasing in the 
parameterθ . A key property to ensure monotone comparative statics is the following:   
 
Definition1 A function :U X θ× →\  where ,X θ ⊂ \ has the Single Crossing Property (SCP) 
if ( ),XU X θ exists and is strictly increasing in θ ∈Θ . 
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( ) ( ) (, ,U X W X C X )θ θ= − has SCP if ( ),XU X θ = ( ) ( ),X XW X C X θ− exists and is 
strictly increasing in θ ∈Θ for all X ∈Χ . In this case, ( ),U X θ  satisfies SCP when the 
marginal cost of output ( ,XC X )θ  is decreasing in type θ , i.e., higher types always have gentler 
indifference curves. SCP implies that large increases in X  are less costly for higher parametersθ . 
 
Theorem 1 (Edlin and Shannon) 
 Let θ θ′′ ′> ), (arg max ,
X
X U X θ
∈Χ
′ ′∈ , and ( )arg max ,
X
X U X θ
∈Χ
′′∈ ′′ . Then, if U  has SCP, 
and either X ′  or X ′′ is in the interior ofΧ , then X X′′ ′> . 
 
Proof See, Appendix 1 
 
 We can apply Theorem 1 to the agent’s choice when facing a wage scheme , assuming that 
the agent’s cost 
( )W ⋅
( ,C X )θ satisfies SCP. To ensure full separation of types, we need to assume that 
the wage is differentiable. Then, ( )W ⋅ ( ),U X θ will satisfy SCP, and Theorem 1  implies that 
interior output choices are strictly increasing in types, i.e., we have full separation. 
 
3.3 The Full information Benchmark 
 
As a benchmark, we consider the case in which the Principal observes the Agent’s typeθ . Givenθ , 
she offers the bundle ( ),X W  to solve: 
( )
( )
,
max ( )
s.t.   ( ) , 0    (IR)  
X W
X W X
W X C X θ
∈Χ×
−
− ≥
\  
 
(IR)  is the Agent’s Individual Rationality constraint, and binds at a solution. Hence, the 
Principal eventually solves: 
(IR)
( )max ,
X
X C X θ
∈Χ
−  
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This is exactly the Total Surplus maximization. Let ( )FBX θ denote a solution, which we call the 
First Best (FB) solution. Using Theorem 1, we check whether our assumptions ensure that 
( )FBX θ is strictly increasing in typeθ . If ( ),C X θ  satisfies SCP, which implies that Total 
Surplus ( ,X C X )θ− satisfies SCP, and if ( )FBX θ is in the interior for eachθ , we can conclude 
that ( )FBX θ is strictly increasing inθ . 
Now we consider a different contract from the contract which we have considered 
so far, where the agent is asked to announce his type 
:W X →\
θˆ , and receives payment ( )ˆW θ in exchange 
for an output ( )ˆX θ on the basis of his announcement θˆ . This is called a Direct Revelation 
Contract. According to the Revelation Principle, any contract  can be replaced with a 
Direct Revelation Contract that has an equilibrium in which all types receive the same bundles as in 
the original contract . 
:W X →\
:W X →\
 
3.4 Solution with a Continuum of Types 
 
Let the type space be continuous: ,θ θ⎡ ⎤Θ = ⎣ ⎦ ,with the cumulative distribution function , and 
with a strictly positive density 
( )F ⋅
( ) ( )f Fθ θ′= . In addition to previous assumptions, we assume 
that ( ,C X )θ is continuously differentiable in θ  for all X , and ( ),C Xθ θ is bounded 
uniformly across ( ),X θ . The principal’s problem is: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( )
, ( )
ˆ
max ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆs.t.   ( ) , ( ) ,    IC   ,
       ( ) , 0                                (IR )            
X W
X W f d
W C x W C x
W C x
θ
θ
θθ
θ
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
⋅ ⋅
−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
− ≥ − ∀ ∈
− ≥ ∀ ∈Θ
∫
Θ  
 
Just as in the two-type case, out of all the participation constraints, only the lowest type’s IR binds. 
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Lemma1 At a solution ( )( ), ( ) ,X W⋅ ⋅ all with >IRθ θ θ  are not binding, IRθ is binding. 
 
As for the analysis of ICs with a continuum of types, a major breakthrough was achieved by Mirrlees 
(1971), who suggested a way to reduce the incentive constraints to a much smaller number by 
replacing them with the corresponding First-Order Conditions. The argument is as follows.  
( )IC can be written as ( )ˆ ˆarg max ,Uθθ θ θ∈Θ∈ ,where ( ) (( )ˆ ˆ ˆ, ( ) ,U W C X )θ θ θ θ= − θ is the 
utility that the agent of type θ  receives by announcing that his type is θˆ . If ( , )θ θ θ∈  and 
( ˆ,U )θ θ is differentiable in θˆ , then the first order condition ( ) ˆˆ ˆ,U θ θθ θ θ = 0∂ ∂ =  is necessary 
for the above optimality. We define the Agent’s equilibrium utility (the value): 
( ) ( ) ( )( ), ( ) ,U U W C Xθ θ θ θ θ θ≡ = −  
Note that this utility depends on θ  in two ways – through the agent’s true type and through his 
announcement. Differentiating with respect toθ , we have ( ) ( ) (ˆ ,U U Uθθ ),θ θ θ θ θ′ = + , where 
the first derivative of  is with respect to the agent’s announcement (the first argument) and the 
second derivative is with respect to the agent’s true type (the second argument). Since the first 
derivative equals zero by 
U
( ) ˆˆ ˆ, 0U θ θθ θ θ =∂ ∂ = , we have ( ) ( ),U Uθθ θ θ′ = . This condition is 
nothing but the well known Envelope Theorem: the full derivative of the value of the agent’s 
maximization problem with respect to the parameter – his type – equals to the partial derivative 
holding the agent’s optimal announcement fixed. More concretely,  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ( ) , ,, ˆ
ˆ
W C X C XdU d
d d
θ θ θ θ θθ θ θ
θ θθ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡∂ − ∂ −⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎦ ⎣= × + ∂∂ θ
⎤⎥⎦   
Since ( )( )ˆ ˆ( ) ,W C X ˆθ θ θ θ⎡∂ −⎢⎣ ⎤ ∂⎥⎦ =0 at θˆ θ=  (the agent’s optimal announcement is Truth 
Telling), we have the envelope condition: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ),, C XdUU
d
θ θθ θθ θ θ
∂′ = = − ∂ . 
By integrating it, we have the important formula:        
  ( ) ( ) ( )( ),C XU U θθ τ τ dθ θ τ
∂= − ∂∫ τ           (ICFOC) 
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 (ICFOC) demonstrates that with a continuum of types, incentive compatibility constraints pin 
down up to a constant plus all types’ utilities for a given output rule ( )X ⋅ .This remarkable result is 
derived from the generalized Envelope Theorem by Milgrom and Segal (2002) 2, and does not hold 
for the two-type (more generally the finite type) case.  
  Intuitively, (ICFOC) incorporates local incentive constraints, ensuring that the Agent does not gain 
by slightly misrepresentingθ . By itself, it does not ensure that the Agent cannot gain by 
misrepresenting θ  by a large amount. For example, (ICFOC) is consistent with the truthful 
announcement θˆ θ=  being a local maximum, but not a global one. It is even consistent with 
truthful announcement being a local minimum. 
 Fortunately, these situations can be ruled out. For this purpose, recall that by SCP, Topkis (1978) 
and Edlin and Shannon (1998) establish that the agent’s output choices from any tariff (and therefore 
in any incentive compatible contract) are nondecreasing in type. Thus, any piecewise differentiable 
IC contract must satisfy         is nondecreasing   (M) ( )X ⋅
  It turns out that under SCP, ICFOC in conjunction with (M) do ensure that truthtelling is a global 
maximum, i.e., all ICs are satisfied: 
 
Lemma2 ( ) ( )( ,X W⋅ ⋅ )
)
 is Incentive Compatible if and only if both (ICFOC) and (M) hold, 
where ( ) ( )(( ) ,U W C Xθ θ θ= − θ . In summary,  
“Incentive Constraints  First Order Condition（ICFOC）+ Monotonicity (M)” ⇔
 
Proof See, Appendix 2 
 
 Given (ICFOC), it is convenient to use ( ) ( )( )( ) ,U W C Xθ θ θ= − θ to express transfers from 
agent’s utilities: N ( )( ) ( )N
Wage Payment Information Rent Effort Cost 
given for type  
( ) ,W C X U
θ
θ θ θ= +	
 θ
                                                 
  
 
 
2 See “3.1 Mechanism Design” of “3.Applications” in their paper, which uses the integral condition 
(ICFOC) as a generalization of the first-order condition to mechanisms that are not necessarily 
differentiable.   
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3.5 Collusion and Supervision 
 
3.5.1 Introduction of a Supervisor and the Collusion-proof Problem 
 
Now, we introduce a supervisor into the model. The principal can have access, at a cost , to a 
supervisor who can, for each 
z
θ , provide a proof of this fact with probability , and with , 
is unable to obtain any information. We assume that proofs of 
p 1 p−
θ  cannot be falsified. In other words, 
θ  is hard information.3 On the other hand, the agent can potentially benefit from a failure by the 
supervisor to truthfully report that his type is θ  when the supervisor observed the signalθ . A 
self-interested supervisor colludes with the agent only if he benefits from such behavior. We assume 
the following collusion technology: if the agent offers the supervisor a transfer (side payment) , he 
benefits up to , where 
t
kt [ ]0,1k∈ . The idea is that transfers of this sort may be hard to organize 
and subject to resource losses. We follow the literature in assuming that side-contracts of this sort are 
enforceable (See, e.g., Tirole 1992). 
To avoid collusion, the principal will have to offer the supervisor a reward ( )sW θ for providing 
θ , such that the following coalition incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ),s C XW kU k U dθθ τ τθ θ θ τ τ
⎡ ⎤∂≥ = −⎢ ⎥∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  
Indeed, once the information θ  is obtained, the principal will reduce the Agentθ ’s payment 
( )W θ to effort cost ( )( ),C X θ θ , and not pay the information rent ( )U θ  to the agent θ . The 
agent is thus ready to pay the supervisor an amount of ( )U θ , and the value of this side payment to 
the supervisor is ( ) [ ], where 0,1kU kθ ∈ . Therefore, hiring a supervisor and eliciting his 
information requires the principal to pay ( ) ( ) ,sW kUθ θ θ= ∀ to the supervisor if the (hard) 
information of θ  is provided. Substituting ( ) ( )sW kUθ θ=  into the Principal’s objective 
function, the virtual surplus for type θ  in the Principal-Supervisor-Agent regime is,  
                                                  
3 For hard vs. soft information, see, e.g., Tirole (1992). Simply speaking, hard information is verifiable 
with some physical evidence, but can also be concealed. Nonetheless, it cannot be falsified. 
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( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ), 1X C X p pk Uθ θ θ θ− − − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
Hence, the program of designing the optimal collusion-proof contract can be rewritten as  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )N ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
. , .
InformationTotal Surplus
     Rent
max , 1
s.t.        0 : is nondecreasing         ( )
,
                      ( )
          
M
ICFOC
X U
X C X p pk U f d z
dX
X
d
C X
U U d
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θθ
τ τθ θ ττ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥− − − +⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
≥
∂= − ∂
∫
∫
	
 −
( ) ( ) ( )( )  , (Const.)  ( )IRU W C X u θθ θ θ θ= − ≥
 
 
Note that the objective function takes the familiar form of the expected difference between total 
surplus and the Agent’s information rent. 
 
3.5.2 Solving the Relaxed Problem 
 
Thus, the problem can be rewritten as                                                                  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
.
,
max , 1
s.t. 0   M
X
C X
X C X p pk U d f d z
dX
d
θ θ
θ θ
τ τθ θ θ θ τ θ θτ
θ θθ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂− − − + −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟∂⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
≥ ∀
∫ ∫ −
 
where ( ) ( )( ) ( ),C XU dθ θθ θ τ τ f dθ τ θτ
⎡ ⎤∂−⎢ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ θ⎥ can be called the expected information rents. 
 
Lemma3: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
, , 1C X C X F
U d f d U f d
f
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
τ τ θ θ θθ τ θ θ θ θ θτ θ θ
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ −− = −⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫  
 
Proof See, Appendix 3 
 
Substituting these expected information rents into the principal’s program, and ignoring the constant 
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( )U θ , the program becomes 
   
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
.
, 1
max , 1
s.t. 0   
X
C X F
X C X p pk f d z
f
dX
M
d
θ
θ
θ θ θθ θ θ θ θθ θ
θ θθ
⎡ ⎤∂ −− + − +⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
≥ ∀
∫ −
 
 
We ignore the Monotonicity Constraint (M) and solve the resulting relaxed program. Thus, the 
principal maximize the expected value of the expression within the square brackets, which is called 
the virtual surplus, and denoted by ( ),J X θ . This expected value is maximized by simultaneously 
maximizing virtual surplus for (almost) every typeθ , i.e.,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ),1
arg max , 1S
X
C XF
X X C X p pk
f
θ θθθ θ θ θ θ θ⋅
∂⎡ ⎤−∈ − + − +⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ∂⎣ ⎦
 
This defines the optimal output rule ( )SX ⋅  for the relaxed program. The principal’s choice of 
( )SX θ  can be understood as a trade-off between maximizing the total surplus for type θ  and 
reducing the information rents of all types above θ , just as in the two-type case. Indeed, (ICFOC) 
says that output choice X for type θ results in additional information rent ( )( ),C X θ θθ
∂− ∂ for 
all types above θ .  
 In particular, for the highest type θ , there are no higher types, i.e., ( ) 1F θ = , and the principal 
just maximizes total surplus, choosing ( ) ( )S FBX Xθ θ= . In words, we have efficiency at the top. 
For all other types, the principal will distort output to reduce information rents. To see the direction 
of distortion, consider the parameterized maximization program 
  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ),1
max , ,
X
C XF
X X C X
f
θ θθγ θ θ θ γ θ θ∈Χ
∂⎡ ⎤−Ψ = − + ⎢ ⎥ ∂⎣ ⎦
 
Here 0γ =  corresponds to surplus-maximization (first-best), and [ ]( )1 0, 0,1p kγ = = ∈  
corresponds to the principal’s (relaxed) second best program with only one agent. 
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Note that  
              
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )2 ,, 1
0
C XX F
X f X
θ θγ θ
γ θ θ
∂⎡ ⎤∂Ψ −= <⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
 for θ θ<  
since the agent’s value ( ) ( ) ( ),U X W X C X ,θ θ= − has the single crossing property (SCP), that 
is,  
( ) ( )2 2, , 0U X C X
X X
θ θ
θ θ
∂ ∂= − >∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . Therefore, ( ),X γΨ has SCP in ( ),X γ− , and by  
Theorem 1 (Edlin and Shannon), we have ( ) ( ) ( ) (* *1 0FBX X X Xγ θ θ γ )= ⇔ < ⇔ =  for 
allθ θ< . In words, the principal makes all types other than the highest type underproduce in order 
to reduce the information rents of types above them. Similarly, by introducing the supervisor, which 
basically corresponds to 0 1γ< < , we have  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) (* * *1 0,1 0S FX X X X X X )Bγ θ γ θ γ= ⇔ < ∈ ⇔ ≤ = ⇔ θ . 
Hence, in the Principal-Supervisor-Agent regime, the principal can induce more marginal incentives 
than the second best regime with only one agent through the reduction in total and marginal 
information rents paid to the supervisor and the agent θ , in other words, reducing the 
implementation costs for any ( ) ( )S FBX X Xθ θ< = . This result is a generalization of the 
two-type case. Thus, we obtain the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: 
In the Principal-Supervisor-Agent regime with a continuum of types, the optimal collusion-proof 
contract has the property that   
(1) Efficiency at the top (the highest typeθ ) ( ) ( )FBX Xθ θ=                            
(2) Downward distortion for all other types ),θ θ θ⎡∈ ⎣ is mitigated, that is,  
( ) N ( ) N ( )
   Equality      Equality holds
holds at 1    either at 1, 0
      or  
S F
k p k
X X X
θ θ
Bθ θ θ
= = =
=
≤ ≤ .  
 
Now, remember that we ignored the monotonicity constraint (M) and solved the relaxed program. 
So, we need to check that the solution ( )SX θ indeed satisfies the monotonicity constraint (M), that 
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is, the output rule ( )SX θ is nondecreasing. We can check it using Theorem1. To simplify 
expressions, define ( ) ( ) ( )1h f Fθ θ θ≡ −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ 0> , which is called the hazard rate of type θ . 
Then, the principal’s program can be rewritten as    
               ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )1 ,max , ,
X
p pk C X
J X X C X
h
θθ θ θ θ∈Χ
− +⎡ ⎤ ∂⎣ ⎦= − + ∂  
By Topkis (1978) and Theorem 1, assuming that ( ),C X θ is sufficiently smooth, a sufficient 
condition for ( )SX θ  to be nondecreasing in θ is for the following derivative to be strictly 
increasing inθ : 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )21, , ,1           p pkJ X C X C X
X X h X
θ θ θ
θ θ
− +⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦= − + ∗∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
Since ( ,C X )θ− satisfies SCP, the second term is strictly increasing inθ , and the first term does 
not depend on θ . The only problematic term, therefore, is the third term. Our result is ensured when 
the third term is nondecreasing in θ . Since ( )1 h θ is positive and ( )2 ,C X Xθ θ∂ ∂ ∂ is 
negative, this is ensured when ( )2 ,C X Xθ θ∂ ∂ ∂ is nondecreasing. That is, we have 
 
Proposition 4: 
A sufficiency condition for the optimal collusion-proof solution ( )SX θ to satisfy the monotonicity 
constraint (M) is that the following conditions hold. 
1. ( )2 ,C X Xθ θ∂ ∂ ∂ is nondecreasing inθ . 
2. The hazard rate ( )h θ is nondecreasing. 
 
Example: The first assumption is satisfied e.g., in the following cost function forms: 
                ( ) ( ),C X X αθ θ= − and ( ) ( ),C X X αθ θ= , 2α ≥  
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The second condition is called the “Monotone Hazard Rate Condition” and satisfied by many 
familiar probability distributions.4 At this time, we can present the following proposition on the 
comparative statics.  
 
Proposition5: 
Suppose that the sufficiency condition in proposition 2 holds. Then, the optimal collusion-proof 
solution ( )SX θ  is nondecreasing in the parameter , and nonincreasing in the parameter . p k
 
Proof See, Appendix 4 
 
This result could be said to demonstrate the advantage of our approach, because the extensions 
of the Tirole (1986) model, such as Laffont and Tirole (1991), Kofman and Lawarree (1993), Laffont 
and Martimort (1997), and Suzuki (1999), often have the complicated structure of a Kuhn-Tucker 
problem with many IC and IR constraints, and so the global characterization of the optimal solutions 
as well as the robust comparative statics are often difficult to obtain, and only a local 
characterization of the solution and comparative statics is possible in the collusion literature 
described above, while on the other hand, we can readily perform a robust (monotone) comparative 
statics, and the rationale of the results is clear and intuitive. 
 
4. Improvement by adding another supervisor 
 
Here, we introduce another supervisor, who is honest (not strategic), but only with a smaller 
probability ( )p p′ ≤  can observe the signalθ . We assume for simplicity that the states which he 
can observe are included in the ones which the main supervisor can observe, and that it is a common 
knowledge. In this setting, when the main supervisor tries to tell a lie (hides the informationθ ) 
collusively, the sub-supervisor observes the signalθ  with probability p′ , and reports it to the 
principal at no incentive cost, since he is honest (not strategic). Then, the main supervisor can not 
obtain any positive information rent. Thus, the expected gain for the main supervisor when he 
observes the signalθ  will be reduced to ( ) ( )p p kU θ′− . Bringing an additional supervisor can 
help, even if it costs z′ , provided he is honest: the sub-supervisor can work as a checking device for 
                                                  
4Of course, in general, neither assumption needs to be satisfied, in which case, the monotonicity condition 
(M) binds. As for this case, see, e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)’s Contract Theory book (Chapter2) 
or Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)’s Game Theory book (Chapter7).  
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collusion and reduce the information rent of the main-supervisor. Due to the reduction of expected 
information rent, the marginal incentive of the agent will also be increased in equilibrium.   
Let us formally check this argument. The principal maximizes the virtual surplus ( ),J X θ ,  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )1 ,max , ,
X
p p p k C X
J X X C X
h
θθ θ θ θ θ θ∈Χ
′− + −⎡ ⎤ ∂⎣ ⎦= − + ∂  
The first order condition for the optimum is,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )21, , ,1 0p p p kJ X C X C X
X X h X
θ θ
θ θ
′− + −⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ θ= − +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ =  
Since ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]1 1 ,   0,p p p k p pk p p′− + − ≤ − + ∀ ∈′ , we have the following proposition on 
the comparison of equilibrium incentives. 
 
Proposition 6: 
Supposing that ( )SX θ′  is the solution of this regime, we obtain:    
             ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )S S FBX X X Xθ θ θ′≤ ≤ ≤ θ  for all ,θ θ θ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦  
 
If the expected reduction in the information rent ( )p kU θ′ is greater than the resource cost z′  of 
sub-supervisor, the principal has indeed an incentive to introduce a sub-supervisor into the 
organization. That is, another auditor can serve as an incentive mechanism not only for the 
main-auditor (main-supervisor) but also for management (agent). This simple argument gives a 
rationale for the auditing system consisting of the main- and sub-supervisors (auditors) in corporate 
governance reform. 
 
5. No Commitment /Renegotiation Problem  
 
So far, we have considered a situation where the principal can commit to the collusion-proof contract. 
Here, we examine more explicitly the timing of the game. The principal has access to the supervisor, 
who chooses a message { }m ,θ∈ ∅ , where ∅  means that he did not obtain any information. If 
the principal receives the message from the supervisor that the type information isθ , the principal 
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will have an incentive to renegotiate the original contract. The principal can raise her payoff by 
eliminating the downward distortions in all other types than the highest one θ . Namely, instead of 
( ) ( ){ },X W ,θ θ she will offer the efficient (first best) contract ( ) ( ){ },FB FBX Wθ θ , and the 
information rent ( )U θ  will be exploited by the principal. If the agent of type θ  anticipates this 
modification, since he can benefit from a failure by the supervisor to report his type θ  truthfully, 
he will offer the supervisor the transfer (side payment) ( )U θ , which the supervisor benefits up to 
, where kt [ ]0,1k∈ . Thus, the principal must pay ( ) ( )sW kUθ θ= to the supervisor in 
opposition to the collusive offer by the agent, in order to elicit the true information. In summary, the 
principal strictly improves his payoff by changing ( )X θ  into ( )FBX θ  ex post, but the ex ante 
inefficiency ( )kU θ− arises. This is the trade-off in this no commitment/renegotiation problem.5  
The virtual surplus for type θ  in the Principal-Supervisor-Agent regime is written as  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) N ( ) ( )( ) ( ) (
    is (Ex post) First Best Allocative Efficiency revealed
1 , , 1FB FBp X C X p X C X p pk U
θ
)θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤− − + × − − − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦	

 
Eventually, in this regime, the principal maximizes the virtual surplus ( ),J X θ ,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )1 ,max , 1 ,
X
p pk C X
J X p X C X
h
θθ θ θ θ θ θ∈Χ
− +⎡ ⎤ ∂⎣ ⎦⎡ ⎤= − − +⎣ ⎦ ∂  
The first order condition for the optimum is,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )21, ,1 1 p pkJ X C X C Xp
X X h X
θ θ
θ θ
− +⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ , 0θ= − − + =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ∂
                                                 
 
We now have the following proposition on the comparison of equilibrium incentives. 
 
 
 
 
5This idea is close to the renegotiation problem from lack of commitment to the long term contract, which 
was first considered by Dewatripont (1988)  
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Proposition 7: 
Supposing that ( )RX θ  is the solution (in the no-information phase∅ ) of this regime, we obtain:   
           ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )R S SX X X X X FBθ θ θ θ′≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ θ  for all ,θ θ θ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦  
 
The first inequality arises from the fact that the principal designs the optimal contract of the no- 
information phase  taking the ex ante inefficiency ∅ ( )pkU θ− into consideration. That is, the 
principal tries to optimally reduce the agent’s information rent ( ) ( )( ),RC XU dθθ θ θθ θθ
∂= − ∂∫ , in 
order to mitigate the collusive pressure by the agent when the supervisor observed the signalθ . 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Recently, auditing to meet the needs of corporate governance has rapidly been increasing in 
importance in Japan, as well as in the U.S. and Western countries. Given this trend, we were 
motivated to build a theoretical model to examine how supervision (auditing) could be utilized in 
order to enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance and to deter collusive supervision 
(auditing). We started with an extremely simple three-tier collusion model (in section2), which is a 
natural extension of the familiar screening (self selection) models, and then generalized its 
investigation to a continuum of types version (in and after section3). We introduced the outcomes of 
“Monotone Comparative Statics” à la Topkis (1978) and Edlin and Shannon (1998), and Milgrom 
and Segal (2002)’s generalized envelope theorem into a familiar screening (self selection) model 
with a continuum of types, and constructed a three-tier agency model with a mathematically 
tractable structure. This should be an advantage in modeling in comparison with the collusion 
literature e.g., Kofman and Lawarree (1993)’s auditing application of the three-tier agency model à 
la Tirole (1986, 1992). The basic trade-off involved in adding the auditor (supervisor) into the 
hierarchy is the benefit obtained by the discrete reduction in information rent and the improvement 
of marginal incentives (outputs) versus the resource cost of the auditor (supervisor). This bottom line 
was consistently preserved through the model.  
It should be noted that throughout the paper we have used the revelation principle, solving 
programs in which the principal always prevents collusion between the auditor (supervisor) and the 
manager (agent). In the optimal contract, nobody colludes: this is called the collusion-proof principle. 
However, this does not imply an obvious inconsistency with reality, where collusive supervision 
(auditing) often makes headlines, as stated in the introduction. The revelation principle and the 
 26
collusion-proof principle are a solution technique which facilitates characterization of the optimal 
contract. Indeed, if we consider an incomplete grand contract situation like Tirole (1992), Laffont 
and Tirole (1991), and Suzuki (1999), equilibrium collusion can improve efficiency. Such models 
indeed could be usefully applied, in such fields as political economy, regulation, and authority 
delegation in organizations. We also showed as an application what happens when the principal 
cannot commit to the mechanism and the renegotiation is unavoidable. In summary, we can say that 
the contribution of our paper is to apply the monotone comparative statics method to the three-tier 
agency model with hidden information and collusion, to provide a framework that can address the 
issues treated in the existing literature in a much simpler fashion, and to derive some clear and robust 
implication applicable to corporate governance reform. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix1 Proof of Theorem1 
 
Suppose for definiteness that X ′  is in the interior of Χ . Then, the following first-order 
condition must hold: . But then by SCP, ( ),XU X θ′ ′ = 0 ( ) ( ), ,X XU X U Xθ θ′ ′′ ′ ′> = 0 , and 
therefore X ′  cannot be optimal for parameter value θ′′ - a small increase in X  would increase 
. Therefore,U X X′′ ′≠ . It will yield the result X X′′ > ′ .                         Q.E.D 
                                                                    
Appendix2 Proof of Lemma2 
 
Proof The “⇒ ” part was established above. It remains to show that local IC and monotonicity 
imply that ( ) ( )ˆ,U Uθ θ θ≤  for all ˆ,θ θ . Forθˆ θ> , we can write  
         
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ, ( ) ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ                         , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ                         , ,
ˆ , ,
                         
       
U U W C X U
U C X C X U
C X C X U U
C X C X
d d
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ
θ τ τ τ
θ
τ ττ τ
− = − −
= + − −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
∂ ⎡ ⎤∂= + −⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫
( )( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ , ,
                  0
C X C X
d
θ
θ
θ τ τ τ ττ τ
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂⎢ ⎥= − ≤⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫
 
Here the last equality obtains by (ICFOC)6, and the inequality obtains by SCP and the fact that 
( ) ( )ˆX Xθ τ≥ by (M). The proof for ˆθ θ>  is similar.                          Q.E.D 
 
Appendix3 Proof of Lemma3 
 
Proof:  
                                                  
6 ( ) ( ) ( ) N ( )( ) ( )( )ˆ
Envelope 
  Theorem
, ,ˆ C X C XdUU U d d
d
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
τ τ τ τ
dθ θ τ τ ττ τ
∂ ∂− = = − = −∂ ∂∫ ∫ ∫∵ ττ  
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We transform the expected information rents by exploiting “Integration by Parts”.          
 Now, remember that  
           ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),C XU d f d Uθ θ θθ θ θτ τ f dθ τ θ θ θ θτ
⎡ ⎤∂− =⎢ ⎥∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫ θ   
Because
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
Due to Envelope Theorem
,
,
C XdU
U F U f F U f F
d
θ θθθ θ θ θ θ θ θθ θ
∂′ = + = −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ∂	
 	

θ  
and so ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ),C XU f U F Fθ θθ θ θ θ θ
∂′= +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ∂ θ , we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
,
, ,
C X
U f d U F F d
C X C X C X
U F d U d
θ θθ
θθ θ
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
θ θθ θ θ θ θ θ θθ
θ θ θ θ θ θ,
F dθ θ θ θ θ θ θθ θ
∂= +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂= + = − +∂ ∂ ∂
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ ∫ θ
( ) ( ) ( )( ),C XU U dθθ θ θθ θ θθ
⎛ ⎞∂= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠∫∵  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
, , 1
1
C X C X F
U F d U
f
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ
f dθ θ θ θ θθ θ
∂ ∂ −= − − = −∂ ∂∫ ∫ θθ
                                                                     Q.E.D 
 
Appendix4 Proof of Proposition3 
 
Proof: From the equation ( , the derivative)∗ ( ),XJ X θ is nondecreasing in the parameter , 
because the derivative of 
p
( ,XJ X )θ in the parameter is p 1 0k− + ≤ for [ ]0,1k∈ . Hence, 
from the theorem1, the optimal solution ( )SX θ is nondecreasing in the parameter . 
Particularly, 
p
( )SX θ  is strictly increasing in for p [ )0,1k∈  from theorem 1. The latter part 
can also be proved in the same way: The derivative ( ),XJ X θ is nonincreasing in the parameter 
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k  for [ ]0,1p∈ , and thus the optimal solution ( )SX θ is nonincreasing in the parameter .   k
Q.E.D 
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付録１．情報経済論 配布資料 
 
コーポレートガバナンス（企業統治）と自己選抜モデル 
                          2006 年 12 月 6 日（水） 鈴木 豊 
（準備） 
１． エージェンシー関係 株主―経営者 契約の束（Nexus of contracts） 
２． 「コーポレートガバナンス」の定義：企業経営者に対する規律付け ほか 
３． トップマネジメント組織 株主総会（P）―取締役会（A）―監査役（S） 
 
（問題） 
株主（プリンシパル）、経営者（エージェント）からなるゲームを考える。株主（大株主）
は企業を所有し、企業の経営者を労働市場から雇い入れる。その時、経営者によって、企
業利潤  が生み出される。ここで、  は経営者のeπ θ= + θ 経営能力（タイプ）で か1の
いずれかであり、  は経営者の経営努力であるとする。努力  を支出する時のコストを
0
e e
( ) 2 4e eψ =  とすると、経営者の効用（利得）関数は、W  を所得として、 ( )W eψ− とな
る。また、経営者の留保利得は であるとする。契約前に、タイプ0 { }0,1θ∈  はランダムに
決まり、真のθ  は経営者のみが知る私的情報であり、株主には  がθ 等確率で か1のいず
れかであるという情報、つまり
0
( ) ( )Pr 0 Pr 1θ θ= = = 1 2= ということのみがわかっている
とする。この下で、プリンシパル（株主）はエージェント（経営者）に、要求する利潤 と
報酬  からなる契約 
π
W { },Wπ を提示する。 
1.  プリンシパル（株主）が  を知っている時の最適解（完全情報解）を導出せよ。 θ
2.  本文のように、プリンシパル（株主）が エージェント（経営者）のタイプ  を知らな θ
いケースを考える。この時の最適（分離）契約（各タイプ用の2 種類の契約を提示する時
の最適解）が満たすべき重要な条件を二つ示し、その意味を明らかにせよ。 
3.   その問題を解き、最適解を導出せよ。能力の高い経営者と、能力の低い経営者でいずれ
がファーストベストの経営努力を行うか？ いずれがスラック（Slack）するか？ また、
最適解がなぜそのような形を取るか、理論的な直観を述べよ（図示でも良い）。 
４．３の最適解の状況を仮定する。今、株主が、第３者（監査役・会計士(Auditor)等） を
使って、経営者のタイプ を調査し、 であるという（証拠を伴う）情報を提供し
た場合には、
θ 1θ=
1 8sW = の報酬をやるという契約を彼と結んだ。このとき、いかなる問
題が生じうるか、次の用語を使いながら数値を交えて指摘せよ。用語：情報レント、
結託(collusion) 
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コーポレートガバナンス（企業統治）と自己選抜モデル 
 
３．株主（プリンシパル）と経営者（エージェント）を考える。株主は企業を所有し、企
業の経営者を労働市場から雇い入れる。その時、経営者によって、企業利潤 eπ θ=  が生み
出される。ここで、  は経営者のθ 経営能力（タイプ）で1か のいずれかであり、  は経
営者の経営努力であるとする。努力e  を支出する時のコストを
2 e
( ) 2 4e eψ =  とすると、経
営者の効用（利得）関数は、W  を所得として、 ( )W となる。また、経営者の留保利
得は0 であるとする。契約前にタイプ
eψ−
{ }1,2θ∈  はランダムに決まり、真のθ  は経営者の
みが知る私的情報であり、株主には  がθ 等確率で1か のいずれかであるという情報、つ
まり
2
( ) ( )Pr ということのみが分かるとする。この下で、プリンシパル
（株主）はエージェント（経営者）に、要求する利潤 と報酬 W  からなる契約 {
1 Pr 2 1 2θ θ= = = =
π },Wπ を
提示する。 
（1 ） プリンシパル（株主）が θ  を知っている時の最適解（完全情報解）を導出せよ。 
（２） 本文のように、プリンシパル（株主）が エージェント（経営者）のタイプθ  を知
らないケースを考える。この時の最適（分離）契約（各タイプ用の2種類の契約を提示
する時の最適解）が満たすべき重要な条件を二つ示し、その意味を明らかにせよ。 
（３）その問題を解き、最適解を導出し、その特徴づけをせよ。さらに、最適解がなぜそ
のような形を取るかについての理論的な直観を述べよ（図示でも良い）。 
（４）（３）の最適解の状況を考える。今、株主が、第３者（監査役（会）） を設置して、
経営者のタイプ を調査し、θ 2θ = であるという（証拠を伴う）情報を提供した場合に
は、 の報酬をやるという監査契約を結んだ。その際、いかなる問題が生じうる
か。次の用語を使い、数値を具体的に入れながら説明せよ。
2sW =
用語：情報レント、馴れ
合い監査、日本型ガバナンス、監査役設置会社。 
 
（注）授業では企業利潤が eπ θ= + （加法型）のケースを解いたが、ここでは、企業利潤
は eπ θ= （乗法型）であることに注意しながら解答せよ。 
 
（注）「本付録 2 問とその解答」が、論文２節の Motivational Examples に書かれている。 
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